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NOTE
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS FOR
DECEDENT'S FEDERAL TAX LIABILITY
The defendant in Leroy K. New' was a practicing attorney acting
as substitute administrator for an estate of a decedent indebted to the
United States for income taxes. Because he had distributed estate
assets, leaving the estate insolvent, without first satisfying the debt
due the United States, the Tax Court found him personally liable for
those taxes under section 6901(a) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
During the administration of the estate, the defendant attended
several meetings with officers of the bank which had been the original
administrator. At each of these meetings, the bank's trust officer, among
others, informed the defendant that the decedent had failed to file
income tax returns for the last five years of his life, and that the estate
was believed to be indebted to the federal government thereby in the
amount of $4,000 to $5,000. The fact-that the defendant was so informed
was corroborated at the trial by persons in attendance at the various
meetings.
Acting upon this information, the defendant commenced an exami-
nation of bank records pertaining to the properties and investments of
the decedent. The records revealed that the decedent had received
taxable income from these sources, but they showed nothing about his
other sources of income. In addition, the defendant questioned "some
people" in the town where the decedent had owned rental property and
examined records there to determine if there had been rental income.
However, these examinations never divulged the full extent of the dece-
dent's tax liability.
Without doing more, the defendant distributed all of the assets of
the estate leaving the estate unable to pay the taxes due. Thereafter,
he received his full and final discharge as administrator from the
probate court. It was not until after the probate proceedings and after
the defendant's discharge as administrator that the Commissioner made
a formal claim for the taxes, seeking to hold the defendant personally
liable. For his defense, the defendant relied heavily on his discharge
as administrator and the entry of the final judgment. The Tax Court
rejected his defense as being without merit, finding that the statutory
and case law prerequisite for holding an administrator personally liable
for unpaid debts owed the United States had been fulfilled.
This note is an attempt to identify and clarify those prerequisites,
as defined in the past and as further clarified by the instant case.
1 48 T.C. 671 (1967).
The court relied on section 6910(a) (1) (B) .2 It, in effect, provides
for the application of sections 3466 and 3467 of the Revised Statutes
which contain three statutory prerequisites. Section 34663 establishes
the prerequisites of debt due to the United States and insolvency and
these must first be' satisfied before section 34674 is applicable.
The debt prerequisite is fulfilled whenever there is money owing to
the United States by a person or an estate. Income, gift, and estate
taxes have been held to be debts to the United States.5 For an executor
or administrator charged with personal liability, the question of when
a debt came into existence could be an important one where there was
no formal claim for, nor assessment of, the debt made by the Govern-
ment before the distribution of estate assets. If there is no debt until
such action is taken, the debt prerequisite would fail. The courts have
answered this question by holding that the Government is not bound
to become a party to probate proceedings nor file its claim therein, 6
and that assessment is not necessary. 7 As far as taxes' are concerned,
a debt exists whenever a tax can legally be imposed, and the right to
its collection is not contingent upon the Government's discovery of its
existence nor upon other procedural steps.8
The fact that the Commissioner had not determined the existence
of the liability prior to the discharge of the administratrix does
2 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6901 Transferred Assets
(a) Method of Collection. - The amounts of the following liabilities shall,
* . be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the
same provisions and limitations as in the case. of the taxes with respect to
which the liabilities were incurred:
(1) Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes. ......
(B) Fiduciaries. - The liability of a fiduciary under section 3467 of the
revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191) in respect of the payment of any tax de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) 'from the esatte of .... the decedent,
3 Revised Statutes, § 3466 (31 U.S.C. 191) :
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or when-
ever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors, is in-
sufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the
United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend
to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts,
makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or' in which the estate and affects of
an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as
to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.
4 Revised Statutes, § 3467(31 U.S.C. 192).
5 Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926), established the rule that taxes
are debts to the United States. Since then a taxpayer's fiduciary was found
liable for unpaid gift taxes in Want v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.
1960), and for deficient estate taxes in United States v. First Huntington
Nat'l Bank, 34 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. W.Va. 1940).
6Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
7 Lillia L. Morris, 36 B.T.A. 516 (1937).
SIn United States v. Vibradamp Corp., 257 F. Sup'p. 931 (S.D. Cal. 1966), the
court held that the Government must assert a claim before distribution of
estate assets in order to satisfy the debt prerequisite of § 3466. This is a
minority ruling, however, and the court seemed to confuse the debt prerequi-
site and the notice prerequisite. The court concluded that a fiduciary must
have actual notice of the debt in order to be liable and that the Government
must assert its claim before distribution in order that such notice exist.
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not alter the fact that the liability of the estate to pay the tax
existed prior to such discharge and that it was due to be satisfied
from the assets of the estate.9
Procedurally the Government need only proceed within the time set by
the statute of limitations of the Internal Revenue Code.
Insolvency occurs whenever the property of the estate is insufficient
to pay the debts of the decedent. 10 Thus, if an executor finds, or, as a
result of his distributions (as in the case here), causes the estate's
liabilities to exceed its assets, the estate is deemed insolvent within the
meaning of the section.
The importance of these two prerequisites is that once met they
operate to give a priority to the debts due the United States. The
priority of the United States, however, does not extend to all debts
owed by the debtor or estate. Valid prior liens and the expenses in-
curred by the settlement of an estate are superior." But with these
exceptions, it can be safely said that if insolvency exists, priority at-
taches to the debts due the United States and the fiduciary proceeds
at his peril under section 3467.12 Section 3467 supplies the third pre-
requisite: the payment of other debts before satisfaction of the debts
due to the United States.
Section 3467 names executors, administrators, assignees, and other
persons as those to whom it applies, and the courts have liberally
interpreted the clause "other person" to include trustees in bank-
ruptcy,13 stockholders in complete control of the assets of an insolvent
corporation,'14 and court appointed receivers.15
Although section 3467 provides for liability only where the fiduciary
satisfies other debts in disregard of the Government's priority, the cases
have based liability on the making of any distribution whatsoever.16
9 Elna S. Evans, 12 B.T.A. 334, 338-9 (1928).
10 Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L. J. 905, 934 (1954).11 An executor was not liable for discharging a valid prior lien in disregard
of a debt owing the United States by selling land used as collateral for a loan
to repay that loan. Union Guardian Trust Co., 41 B.T.A. 1306 (1940). In
United States v. Weisburn, 48 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1943), the court per-
mitted payment of settlement costs in disregard of a United States claim.
The costs included the widow's exemption, administrative expenses, the costs
of a headstone, advertising, filing inventory, appraiser's and attorney's fees
and the accountant's commission.
12 Alexander, Personal Liability of Executors and Trustees for Federal Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes, 9 TAx L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1953). § 3467 provides:
Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays, in
whole or in part, any debt due by the person or estate for whom or for which
he acts before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from
such person or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate
to the extent of such payments for the debts so due to the United States, or
for so much thereof as may remain due and unpaid.
'I United States v. Kaplan, 74 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1935).
14Lakeshore Apartments, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1965).
15 United States v. Crocker, 313 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1963).16 Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. First
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"The cases have not carefully considered the language in section 3467
requiring a debt payment and ... limiting liability to other debts paid,
but the dogma that either payment of debts or the making of a dis-
tribution will render the executor liable for the estate taxes seems
deeply ingrained.' 7 This conclusion is not limited in application to
estate taxes but applies to other debts as well.
The satisfaction of these prerequisites fulfills the statutory require-
ments. But to hold a fiduciary liable at this point would place an im-
possible burden upon him.'8 To avoid holding the fiduciary liable for
disregarding debts to the United States which were unknown to him at
the time of distribution, the courts developed the additional requirement
that unless the fiduciary had notice of the debt due to the United States,
he would not be liable under section 3467. Since United States v.
Clark,'9 one of the first cases so holding, the courts have relieved
fiduciaries where no notice existed.
In Irving Trust Co. 20 the court relieved a trustee in bankruptcy
who was charged under section 3467. No notice was found, since the
debt due the Government was not shown in any of the records of the
bankrupt nor revealed in an oral examination of witnesses. Other courts
have reached the same results under similar circumstances. 2" And when
there is no notice, the cases lead to the conclusion that the fiduciary
is under no duty to search for or make an inquiry about a possible
debt to the United States." One case holds in this regard that there
is no duty to recall past contracts with the Government and inquire
Huntington Nat'l Bank, 34 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. W.Va. 1940); United States
v. Monroe, 65 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
17Alexander, supra note 12, at 15.
18An executor would find himself in a dilemma whenever he desired to dis-
tribute assets. For instance, if the deceased taxpayer filed a deficient tax re-
turn, one in which the tax imposed exceeded the amount shown as the tax
by the taxpayer on his return, even a prudent executor may be unable to
discover the existence of the debt due. He would then be forced to delay
distribution until the three year limitation for assessment had passed or risk
liability. The same dilemma exists where the deceased taxpayer failed to file
returns or failed to pay the tax due. The government has in the past charged
fiduciaries with liabilities under such circumstances. Giovaninni Terranova,
12 P-H T.C.M. 1186 (1943); United States v. Purdome, 240 F. Supp. 221
(D. Mo. 1963).
1925 F. Cas. 447 (No. 14,807) (C.C.D. N.Y. 1826).
20 36 B.T.A. 146 (1937).
21 Where the defendant was trustee of an insolvent company and he distributed
the assets before he was informed of the debt to the United States, the court
found there was no notice. The only evidence of the debt was a carbon copy
of a letter found in the Government files addressed to the defendant, in-
forming him of the debt, but there was no showing of the posting or re-
ception of the letter. The trustee was not liable. Livingston v. Becker, 40
F.2d 673 (D. Mo. 1929). Similar results were reached when the Com-
missioner determined a tax liability by an examination of the decedent's
bank deposits after the executor had distributed the assets. The executor had
no notice. Giovaninni Terranova, 12 P-H T.C.M. 1186 (1943).
22 "But the petitioner was under no duty to seek out unknown creditors of the
bankrupt." Irving Trust Co., 36 B.T.A. 146, 149 (1937).
19691 NOTE
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW\
whether money is still owing under them when no facts exist which
would indicate there was such a debt. 3
Notice, the fourth prerequisite, has been found to exist in two
different forms, actual and circtimstantial notice. Actual notice is actual
knowledge or actual awareness of the debt. If the fiduciary has such
knowledge of the debt, it matters not how that knowledge was ob-
tained.24 Actual notice exists when a revenue agent advises a fiduciary,
2
1
or the Internal Revenue Service sends written notice to a fiduciary.26
It exists when the Internal Revenue files a claim for the debt against
the estate, 27 and when a proceeding for the redetermination of a tax
deficiency occurs during the administration of an estate.2 8 Circumstantial
notice is not of the debt itself, but actual knowledge of facts which
would cause a prudent man to inquire about the existence of a debt.
Clark held it was sufficient notice if the fiduciary was in "possession of
such facts as that a faithful and fair discharge of his duty would put
him on an inquiry."29 The court there imposed on the fiduciary the
duty to inquire "at the proper office, to see what the debt was .... "30
United States v. Barnes stated the rule thusly: "Information which
puts a party upon inquiry, and shows where the inquiry may be effec-
tively made is notice of all facts to which the inquiry might have led."'3 1
The instant case is an example of how this rule is effectuated.
The court, relying on the Clark case with its comparable fact. situ-
ation, found that Mr. New had circumstantial notice of the debt. In
Clark the defendant, a trustee, was informed by the assignor of a surety
of a bond to the United States that the bond was believed broken. The
defendant made no inquiry. It was held that such information was
sufficient to put the trustee on notice and he was held liable. The
trust officer who informed Mr. New was aware of the decedent's fi-
nancial situation. He had known the decedent when the latter was the
beneficiary of a trust administered by the bank and he had also been
personally in charge of the estate before the bank was removed as
administrator. In the instant case, the court decided that the unofficial
information was sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry,32 and that it
showed where such inquiry could be effectively made. Indeed, the
23 United States v. Vibradamp Corp., 257 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
24 United States v. Kaplan, 74 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1935).25 Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).26 United States v. Luce, 78 F. Supp. 241 (D. Minn. 1948); United States v.
Monroe, 65 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Pa. 1496) ; United States v. First Huntington
Nat'l Bank, 34 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. W.Va. 1940).
27John H. Beasley, 42 B.T.A. 275 (1940).
28 Lillia L. Morris, 36 B.T.A. 516 (1937).
29 United States v. Clark, 25 F. Cas. 447, 451 (No. 14,807) (C.C.D. N.Y. 1826).
30 Ibid.
3131 F. 705, 707 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1889).
32 ".. . Leroy was in possession of more than enough facts and notice as that
a faithful and fair discharge of his duty should have put him on inquiry."
Leroy K. New, 48 T.C. 671, 678 (1967).
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defendant did conduct an inquiry, but the court deemed it an ineffective
one:
Such 'investigation and inquiry' in no way satisfies petitioner's
duty. If a fiduciary is put on inquiry, the fact that he inquires
wrongly or haphazardly is not enough and is no defense. To
absolve petitioner because his inquiry turned out to be iniade-
quate would be to reward the careless fiduciary and to put a
premium on rapid cursory investigations. Once a fiduciary is
put on notice sufficient to put a reasonable prudent person on
-inquiry, he thereafter pursues a unilateral inquiry at his peril.
Any other conclusion would make the fiduciary the final arbiter
of what the estate owed in tax, a result entirely nullifying all
effect of 31 U.S.C. 192."3 [Emphasis Added]
The examination of bank records and the questioning of witnesses
by the defendant was termed a unilateral inquiry and was considered
inadequate to discharge his duty to inquire. Presumably a bilateral
inquiry would be adequate or effective, but a bilateral inquiry was not
defined. In its opinion, the court did indicate that the defendant should
have inquired at the local I.R.S. office and that any inquiry which did
not include such a search would not satisfy the defendant's duty. The
I.R.S. office was the "proper office," as required in Clark and the place
"where the inquiry may be effectively made," according to Barnes.
It is safe to conclude therefore that a bilateral inquiry is a search of
both the debtor's records and the appropriate Government records.
Though the notice prerequisite is satisfied by a finding of either
actual or circumstantial notice, the scarcity of cases which have based
liability on circumstantial notice is support for the conclusion that
there is a reluctance to charge a fiduciary with personal liability in the
absence of actual notice.34 At least one court has decided that to hold
a fiduciary liable on the basis of circumstantial notice is to impose too
harsh a rule. In United States v. Vibradamp Corporation,35 the de-
fendant, an executor of an estate of a decedent who many years before
had incurred a debt to the Government through a contract, had known
of the debt at the time of the contract but had forgotten about it.
Nothing occurred before distribution of estate assets to refresh his
memory. In denying the Government's claim, the court concluded that
the fiduciary must have actual notice of the debt, by means of Govern-
ment assertion of the claim before distribution, in order to hold him
liable and to fulfill the debt requirement of section 3466. This con-
clusion appears to be iri conflict with Leroy K. New, but the court in
the latter case distinguished the two cases on the facts. It is evident
33 Id. at 679.
34 Alexander, supra note 12. One example of a finding of liability based on cir-
cumstantial notice is where the fiduciary is obliged to file the income tax re-
turn of the person for whom he acts. C. W. Posey, 20 P-H T.C.M. 368 (1951).
35 257 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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that the court in Vibradamp was anxious to relieve the defendant be-
cause of the long period of time involved. In spite of Vibradamp, the
rule of New (requiring a bilateral inquiry in event of circumstantial
notice) represents the greater weight of authority.
It is important to note at this point that the Government need only
prove the satisfaction of the three statutory prerequisites to establish
liability. The burden of proof is upon the fiduciary to show an absence
of notice.36 This burden is satisfied by a showing of a lack of facts
which would put the fiduciary on inquiry or by a showing that the
inquiry he conducted included an examination of both personal records
and the appropriate Government records.
The burden of making the inquiry at the proper office can be trans-
ferred to the Government by utilizing section 6501(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code. It provides that a proper request for prompt assess-
ment can be made by the fiduciary of a decedent, estate, or corporation.
This has the effect of shortening the statute of limitations for assess-
ment of tax liability from three years to eighteen months and no per-
sonal liability can be imposed for a distribution if no assessment has been
made within 18 months. However, the statutory requirements for mak-
ing a proper request must be followed exactly. Section 6501 (d) has
been very strictly construed, 37 and in only one contested case did the
fiduciary successfully invoke its effect. If the debt is a deficient estate
tax, the Code contains a similar section.39 In fact one should be less
hesitant to use this latter section than section 6501 (d). Estate tax re-
turns are normally audited in any event, but an unnecessary request
under section 6501(d) may result in the auditing of income tax re-
turns which would not have otherwise been audited.
THOMAS G. BOYER
36 L. T. McCourt, 15 T.C. 734 (1950).
3 The importance of making a proper request cannot be too heavily stressed. In
the cases where the fiduciary was unsuccessful, the reason was lack of a
proper request. The requirements of a request are set out in Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6501(d)-i (1959). For an interesting discussion, compare Kohlhase v.
Commissioner, 181 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1950) and Cage v. Commissioner, 15
T.C. 529 (1950).
as Kohlhase v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1950).
39 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2204 provides that if an executor requests a de-
termination of the amount due and discharge from personal liability therefore,
the executor will be notified of the amount due within one year of such
request, and, upon payment of the tax, the executor will be discharged from
personal liability for any deficiencies later found to be owing.
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